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Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: Shifting
Sands of a Bedrock?
AZHAR J. MINHAS*

INTRODUCTION

magine that one fine evening you step out of your front door for a
leisurely stroll in the neighborhood. The evening breeze starts to work
its magic quietly as you begin to walk, peeling and lifting the cares of
the day off your being. As you draw closer to the curve in the street ahead
you hear voices, faint at first, but rising as you move closer. You start to
pay attention. The voices grow louder. Now you can not only hear, but
also see the source of the voices. It is a neighbor down the street, locked in
a heated argument with a stranger. As you draw nearer and listen, you can
get the jist of the argument. It turns out that the neighbor had contracted
with the stranger, a landscaper, to build a fifteen foot long retaining wall in
his garden. The landscaper is claiming that the job is done; he has built the
wall that is fifteen feet long and is now entitled to be paid. The neighbor
says, "No, the wall is not fifteen feet long." Now you are upon the
combatants. You stop. You see each one of them holding an object in his
hand claiming that object to be a "foot." They each in turn go to the newly
created wall, and lay the object against it counting fifteen times, then hold
their "yardstick" triumphantly and proclaim, "This is a foot." The
combatants now see you. They both turn to you, expectant and imploring.
"Please, you decide ...

is this wall fifteen feet or not?" What if you also

do not know what a "foot" is?
An infinitely more serious and consequential version of the above
imaginary scenario is played out in a criminal courtroom every time an
accused goes to trial. It is a "bedrock" principle of our criminal
jurisprudence, that the state has the burden of proving the guilt of the
defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. A standard jury instruction to this
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effect' is read out to the prospective jurors, prior to jury selection process,
hinted upon (to put it mildly) during voir dire, and then again given to the
selected jury panel at the close of all the evidence in a trial. In Illinois,
however, at no point is the phrase "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" ever
defined. In this state, it is assumed as a matter of law, that the term
"reasonable doubt" does not need any elaboration, and
is therefore
understood by the fact finders. 2 How did we get to this point? In Part I of
this article, the author attempts an answer through a historical perspective.
Part II of the article then focuses on the issue of whether jurors do
understand the concept "beyond a reasonable doubt." Part III traces the
constitutional underpinnings of this standard, and in Part IV, it is argued
that a definition of reasonable doubt is not only possible, but is a necessary
prerequisite to restoring justice in our criminal jurisprudence.
I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON REASONABLE DOUBT INSTRUCTIONS IN
ILLINOIS

Illinois is not alone in prohibiting a jury instruction defining the
burden of proof in a criminal case.3 Whereas this prohibition practiced
now in every criminal courtroom in Illinois is of a relatively recent origin,
the idea that the phrase "reasonable doubt" is its own best meaning4 has
been a part of this state's criminal jurisprudence for over a century.
Despite this "self-explanatory" view of the phrase, around the turn of the
20th century it was a common practice for a court to tender an instruction
to the jury defining the phrase "reasonable doubt."
Prior to the publication of the First Edition of Illinois Pattern
Instructions - Criminal (I.P.I. Crim.) in 1968, and adoption of Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 451 effective January 1, 1969, requiring courts to use
I.P.I. Crim. instructions applicable to a case, all instructions to a jury were
drafted by the parties involved, then agreed to before the presiding judge
for submission to the jury. Under these circumstances it is not difficult to
imagine the learned counsel involved in trials drafting instructions in
phraseology best suited to their respective positions, and a presiding judge
treading very carefully through such drafts, selecting with one eye on the
facts of the case, and the other focused on an eventual appellate review.
1.
2.
3.

I.P.I. 2.03.
People v. Malmenato, 150 N.E.2d 806, 811 (Ill. 1958).

See Henry A. Diamond, Reasonable Doubt: To Define or Not to Define, 90

Colum. L. Rev. 1716.
4.
See, e.g., People v. Lucas, 91 N.E. 659 (Ill. 1910); People v. Rogers, 154 N.E.
909 (Ill. 1926); People v. Schuele, 157 N.E. 215 (I11.1927).
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The aggrieved counsel was sure to knock on the appellate court's door.
Prior to adoption of I.P.I. Crim., "approximately one quarter of all criminal
appeals raised jury instruction claims, and in which approximately one
quarter of all new5 trials ordered in criminal cases resulted from jury
instruction errors.",
A sampling of this thicket of creativity is in order for it will help the
reader understand the rationale for the current state of the law in this area.
In People v. Rosenberg6 the trial court tendered the following instruction,
which was held erroneous:
"The jury are [sic] instructed that a doubt upon which you
may acquit the defendant must be a reasonable one, not
merely one of speculation or probability. The State is not
required to prove the defendant's guilt beyond all doubt. It
is sufficient if the proof of guilt is beyond a reasonable
doubt, and if the proof in this case convinces you beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, then you
should find him guilty, even though you7 may believe that
there is a possibility that he is innocent.",
The above instruction required the "doubt" to be reasonable, and not
8
merely speculative or probable. In another case, Lucas, reasonable doubt
was defined as "a serious, substantial doubt, and not a mere possibility of a
doubt," and then the rest of the instruction, in separate paragraphs gave
9
examples of what is or is not a reasonable doubt. A characteristic example
of the tendency of that era, i.e., to specify in the instruction as to what is or
0
is not a "reasonable doubt," can be found in Bean v. People.1 The jury
instruction contained seven paragraphs specifying what is or is not a
reasonable doubt."
The court found the instruction so tendered to be acceptable stating
that "[w]hat is a reasonable doubt is liable to be misconceived by a jury;
and, in order to their full understanding of its import, somewhat of
amplification may be excusable."' 12 This tendency of the courts to detail

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, at IX (3d ed. 1992).
108 N.E. 54 (111. 1915).
Id. at 56.
91 N.E. 659 (Il. 1910).
Id. at 664.
1888).
16 N.E. 656 (I11.
Id. at 658-59.
Id. at 658.
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reasonable/unreasonable doubts drew the Illinois Supreme Court's ire in
People v. Rogers," where People's tendered instruction called attention to
a variety of so-called doubts as not being reasonable doubts. The court
said, "Court and counsel will do well to heed the advice of this court in
many cases in which instructions concerning 'reasonable doubt' have been
considered. It is in a term which needs no definition, and it is erroneous to
14
give instructions resulting in an elaboration of it."
Subsequent cases picked up the theme of Rogers admonishing and
dissuading the trial courts from giving instructions defining the phrase
"beyond a reasonable doubt."' 15 Finally in People v. Malmenato,16 the court
seemed to have run out of patience and had this to say: "[r]easonable doubt
is a term which needs no elaboration and we have so frequently discussed
the futility of attempting to define it that we might expect the practice to be
discontinued."1 7 Too many cooks spoil the broth.
Some habits die hard. As evidenced by post-Malmenato cases, at
least for a while, even after Malmenato's directive, the practice of defining
"reasonable doubt" for the jury continued. With the publication
of I.P.I.Criminal, the lower courts and trial counsel were relieved of the burden of
drafting jury instructions in criminal cases. However, in deference to the
Illinois Supreme Court, the I.P.I. Committee did not define reasonable
doubt. 9 Some trial judges, however, felt it necessary to continue to define
the phrase for the jury. For example, in People v. Viser,20 the trial judge,
upon the court's own motion, defined the phrase for the jury in the
following words: "A reasonable doubt means a doubt that is based on
reason and must be substantial rather than speculative. It must be sufficient
to cause a reasonably prudent person to hesitate to act in the more
21
important affairs of his life."
In another post-Malmanato case, the trial judge, instead of giving to
the jury a written instruction on "reasonable doubt," engaged in an in-court
demonstration to explain the concept. The court said:

13. 154 N.E. 909 (I11.1926).
14. Id. at 913.
15. See, e.g., People v. Schuele, 157 N.E. 215 (Il1. 1927); People v. Maffioli, 94
N.E.2d 191 (I11.1950).
16.
150 N.E.2d 806 (I11.1958).
17. Id. at 811.
18. See, e.g., People v. Bowlby, 201 N.E.2d 136 (I11.App. Ct. 1964); People v.
Cagle, 244 N.E.2d 200 (I11.1969); People v. Whittaker, 259 N.E.2d 787 (Ill. 1970).
19. See I Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions § 2.05 (4th ed. 2000) ("The committee
recommends that no instruction be given defining the term 'reasonable doubt."').
20. 343 N.E.2d 903 (I11.1975).
21. Id. at 912 (holding the instruction to be proper).
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By way of example, I will use this glass of water. If you
can see the glass without this rubber band around it. That
rubber band represents proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
The defendant is like a chip of wood in the bottom of the
glass. In order to prove the defendant guilty, the State
must pour in enough water to float the defendant to the line
of reasonable doubt, represented by the rubber band. If
they don't float the defendant that high then they fail and
you must find the defendant not guilty. If they float the
defendant to that line, then they have met their burden of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. And you must find her
guilty. You must not require the State to fill the glass ... I
hope the illustration is helpful to you. It is a sometimes
confusing concept. And I want to be sure you understand it
22
before we go on.
Today, no criminal court in Illinois either in writing or as an
illustration will define the phrase "beyond a reasonable doubt." However,
those readers who work the criminal courts of this state would readily attest
that despite the state of the law in this area, learned counsel for both the
state and for the defendant continue in their respective efforts to circumvent
this prohibition. Every opportunity, either during voir dire, or during
closing arguments is used to advance an "elaboration" of this concept from
the perspective of that counsel, despite the court's dislike for such
practice. Hence comments like "I cannot tell you what reasonable doubt
is; nobody can: but I will tell you what it is not" or "burden of proof is the
same in all criminal cases - whether it is murder or a traffic ticket" are
24
People v. Martinez
common. Consider the comments of the prosecutor in
who found "no quarrel" with the state's burden of proof and stated that
people "throughout the United States are being found guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt everyday of the week. '' 25 The Martinez court found this
comment objectionable because it implies that this burden is a "mere
26
formality" minor detail.

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

People v. Jenkins, 411 N.E.2d 1047, 1048 (Ii. App. Ct. 1980).
People v. Edwards, 302 N.E.2d 306 (II1.1973).
395 N.E.2d 86 (I11.App. Ct. 1979).
Id. at 90.
Id.
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II. Do JURORS UNDERSTAND THE CONCEPT "BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT"?

From the foregoing it is clear that the absence of a jury instruction on
reasonable doubt is predicated upon two main assumptions; one, that fact
finders innately understand what it means, and two, that the phrase is not
amenable to elaboration. The argument that the phrase is self-explanatory
and that the efforts to define it lead to more confusion is a historical subtext
of the second assumption. Thus, in People v. Fox27 Justice Craig noted
with approval the language of an Oklahoma case that stated "[i]t has been
said that the phrase is its own best definition, and any attempt to define the
phrase is likely to leave in the minds of the jury 'a reasonable doubt as to
what a reasonable doubt is.'

' 28

This section of the article will examine the

first of these assumptions.
The issue of whether jurors understand jury instructions has attracted
considerable attention. Various empirical studies have been conducted and
the findings published from time to time. 29 Whereas these studies differ in
design and depth, when it comes to their findings, the researchers speak
with one voice. Jurors do not understand jury instructions, including
instructions on presumption of innocence, and burden of proof. These
studies confirm a view held by many a trial counsel.
In order to charge someone with a criminal offense, and effectuate an
arrest, the prosecution need only have enough evidence to satisfy probable
cause requirement. However, eventual conviction of the defendant needs a
quantum of evidence to satisfy the proof beyond a reasonable doubt
standard. In cases where the state's evidence is very strong, the issue may
never go to trial, but be resolved on a plea of guilty. Therefore, generally
the cases that proceed to trial are necessarily such where the prosecution
and the defense differ as to where the evidence lies on a continuum
between probable cause and a proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The fact
finder, be it a jury or a judge, therefore, is charged with the legal
responsibility of resolving the issue. The way some fact finders have
resolved this issue in actual cases gives one a fair indication of whether the

27.
28.
29.

110 N.E. 26(111. 1915).
Id. at 32, citing Abbott v. Territory of Oklahoma, 16 L.R.A. (N.S.) 260 (1908).
See Bradley Saxton, How Well Do Jurors Understand Jury Instructions? A

Field Test Using Real Juries and Real Trials in Wyoming, 33 LAND & WATER L. REv 59
(1998); David U. Strawn and Raymond Buchanan, Jury Confusion: A Threat to Justice, 59
JUDICATURE 478 (1976); Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are Twelve HeadBetter Than One?, 52 LAW

& CONTEMP. PROBS. 205 (1989); Geoffrey P. Kramer and Dorean M. Koening, Do Jurors
Understand Criminal Jury Instructions? Analyzing the Results of the Michigan Juror
Comprehension Project, U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 401 (1990).
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fact finder really understood the phrase beyond a reasonable doubt. The
following recent cases were selected because in each case, the fact finder,
in the opinion of a reviewing court, convicted a defendant where the
evidence did not measure up to the proof beyond a reasonable doubt
standard.
A.

PEOPLE V. SMITH 3°

The defendant, Steven Smith,, was charged with the offense of murder.
He was tried before a jury in the Circuit Court of Cook County. The jury
returned the verdict of guilty, and then imposed the ultimate penalty, the
sentence of death. The case went to Illinois Supreme Court for direct
review. The court reversed on some evidentiary errors, and remanded for
retrial.331
The second trial also resulted in a conviction, and a sentence of
2
death.
At trial, the main issue revolved around the identity of the perpetrator.
The state presented a witness, Debrah Caraway who, some three days after
the events, had told the police that she had witnessed the shooting and that
defendant was the peTetrator.3 3 She also picked the defendant's picture
from a photo line-up. 4 The state's other witnesses who were with the
victim at the time of the shooting and claimed to have seen the assailant,
however, failed to identify 'the defendant.3 1 One of these witnesses
described the perpetrator as wearing black clothing and a black hat, but
could not recall the details of the clothing or the headwear because it was
too dark to make out the details. 36 Upon the defendant's arrest, a search of
his apartment had produced two black hats, two black jackets, a pair of
black pants, and a pair of black shoes.37 Another state witness, a bartender,
linked one of the jackets and one of the hats as items worn by the defendant
when the bartender saw the defendant in his establishment, the Shamrock
Lounge, that evening prior to the shooting.38 Defendant at that time was in
the company of two other males, one of whom was also dressed in black.39

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

708 N.E.2d 365 (Ill.
1999).
1990).
People v. Smith, 565 N.E.2d 900 (Ill.
Smith, 708 N.E.2d at 366.
Id. at 367.
Id.
Id. at 367-68.
Id. at 367.
Id. at 368.
Smith, 708 N.E.2d at 368.
Id. at 366.
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During trial, the state's witness Caraway testified that she saw the
shooting from across the street and that while she was so situated she saw
the victim come out of the Shamrock Lounge alone, followed by the
defendant, also alone, and saw the defendant shoot the victim. 40 The state's
other witnesses, however, differed in their recollection in that they testified
to being with the victim outside the lounge at the time of the shooting. On
cross-examination, witness Caraway admitted to her use of cocaine around
the time of the murder.4 '
After his conviction based upon the above evidence, the defendant
took the issue to Illinois Supreme Court on direct appeal. The Court
reversed the conviction, holding that "[it is our considered) udgment that
defendant was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.'
B.

PEOPLEV. RODRIGUEZ 3

Defendant Angel Rodriguez was charged with the offense of firstdegree murder for the killing of the victim, Ibrahim Zayed. The cause was
tried before a jury that returned a verdict of guilty. As in Smith, supra, the
main issue was the identity of the perpetrator. The prosecution presented
the testimony of an eyewitness, Andrew Bolton, who was with the decedent
at the time of the shooting. Bolton was seated about two feet from the
victim, who was seated behind the counter watching television and taking
tape off a toy gun. 44 The decedent was shot when someone opened the
front door of the store located some six feet away from Bolton and fired at
Zayed; Bolton was so situated as to be able to see the assailant.45 At the
scene of the crime, Bolton provided the police with a description of the
suspect as to age, height and weight, and clothin, including a colorful knit
cap that came down over the man's eyebrows. 'Thirty minutes after the
shooting, at the police station while helping with a composite sketch, the
witness added a mustache to the face.47 Whereas Bolton claimed to have
seen the defendant a week after the shooting at another shop, a grocery
store, loading a snow blower in a truck, he did not contact the police at that

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 368.
Id.
Smith, 708 N.E.2d at 371.
728 N.E.2d 695 (I11.App. Ct. 2000).
Id. at 700.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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time.48 The grocery store clerk, Steve Salamy, confirmed that someone did
try to sell a snow blower there, but that the person did not match the
composite. Salamy was also unable to pick the defendant out of a police
line-up.49
After defendant's arrest, he was shown to the witness Bolton, in a
line-up. The witness identified defendant as the assailant. 50 However
police had, prior to the line-up, shown the witness Bolton a picture of the
defendant in a photo array, where the defendant's picture was also
identified by the witness. 51 An assistant state's attorney, who interviewed
the defendant in custody, testified that during this interview the defendant
volunteered information that at the time of shooting the victim was holding
a "fake gun."52 However, Bolton had never informed the police of the
existence of a toy gun prior to the defendant's arrest, and no such gun was
ever located by the crime scene investigators from the scene of the
shooting. The assistant state's attorney had also failed to memorialize any
statement or admission, oral or written, as having been made by the
defendant regarding a fake gun in his case file.53
A majority of the appellate court reversed the conviction holding that,
"In our view, the lack of evidence specifically linking defendant to the
crime raises a reasonable doubt that he was, in fact, the shooter Bolton
described at the scene of the crime. 54
C.

5

PEOPLE V. HODOGBEY

Defendant Nelson Hodogbey was tried in a jury trial for the offense of
possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. The jury
returned a verdict of guilty, subsequent to which Hodogbey was sentenced
to a ten-year prison term. At the end of the state's case, the defendant
moved for a directed verdict, which was denied. On appeal the defendant
argued that State's evidence was insufficient to establish his knowledge of
the drugs beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court agreed, and
reversed the conviction.5 6

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Rodriguez, 728 N.E.2d at 700.
Id. at 701.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 709.
Rodriguez, 728 N.E.2d at 709.
714 N.E.2d 1072 (11. App. Ct. 1999).
Id.
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The testimony adduced at trial revealed that customs agents in
England had intercepted a package containing heroin destined for Chicago.
This information was provided to authorities in Chicago, whereby
arrangements were made for the delivery of the package to the addressee,
the defendant. The package was a brown cardboard box, two to three feet
long and approximately a foot and one-half wide. The address label on the
box indicated that the package had originated in Bangkok, Thailand.57
Prior to its delivery, the package was opened in Chicago and was found to
contain heroin, several pairs of leggings packed in plastic, and a
handwritten note, which read, "Dear Nelson, please here [sic] 12 piece of
legettes. I want see [sic] if you can sell quick and good price [sic]. Then
58
next time I would send three dozen. Thank you and bye. Yours, Brown.,
One of the inspectors involved, dressed as a mailman, delivered the
package to relevant address, where it was received by the defendant.59
Some five minutes after receiving the package, the defendant was seen
leaving the building with a friend. The police stopped them on the
sidewalk. Upon demand, the defendant gave the key to his apartment to the
police, who, upon 60search, found the unopened package sitting in the center
of the living room.
In reversing the conviction, the appellate court cited a case which held
that in the context of a charge of possession with intent to deliver,
defendant's knowledge of the presence of the contraband may be
established by circumstantial evidence of defendant's acts or conduct
which would allow the inference that the defendant was aware of the
presence of a controlled substance at the place of discovery. 61 In applying
this principal to the facts of the case, the court noted:
[d]efendant did not open the package. Neither did he hide
the package within his apartment. Rather, he left it,
unopened, in the middle of his living room floor as he went
about other business. The evidence also established that
defendant did not attempt to flee when the officers
approached him on the street, nor did he otherwise resist

1989).

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 1074.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Hodogbey, 714 N.E.2d at 1076, citing People v. Pintos, 549 N.E. 344, 347 (Il1.
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them. In fact, he gave the officers the keys to his
apartment as requested.62

D.

63

PEOPLEV. HODOR

In a recent jury trial held in this author's county of practice, the
following occurred. After listening to the testimony of witnesses from both
sides and the arguments of counsel, the jury started its deliberations at 2:08
p.m., one afternoon. After some three hours of deliberations, the jury asked
a question of the presiding judge: "What do you do if you don't believe
either party on certain issues. I feel both parties are not telling the truth." 64
The court responded in writing, "Follow the instructions of law that you
have been provided. ''65 Some fifty-five minutes thereafter the jury returned
the verdict of guilty. Can it be said that this jury understood the
instructions on burden of proof? It remains to be seen how an appellate
court may answer this question.
A few other examples of recent cases where convictions were reversed
because of the insufficiency of the evidence include People v. Hernandez,6 6
People v. Olsen,67 and People v. Brown.68 Whereas it is true that such an
appellate intervention is rather rare, it cannot be said that the scarcity of
cases reversed on insufficiency of evidence grounds necessarily means that
the fact finders generally understand the standard of proof. It is this
author's view that the answer lies in the standard of appellate review. The
most often articulated standard of review requiring reversal of a conviction
states the test to be "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier-of-fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt., 69 A less
frequently used phrase describes the appellate intervention only when the
evidence is "so palpably contrary to the verdict, or so unreasonable,

62. Hodogbey, 714 N.E.2d at 1076.
63. Trial court case No. 00-CF-133, Boone County, Illinois (on appeal).
64. Letter from jury to trial judge during deliberations on 2/08/02, case No. 00-CF133, Boone County, Illinois (copy on file with author).
65. Letter from trial judge to jury during deliberations on 2/08/02, case No. 00-CF133, Boone County, Illinois (copy on file with author).
66. 729 N.E.2d 65 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
67. 707 N.E.2d 116 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998).
68. 709 N.E.2d 609 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
69. People v. Juarez, 662 N.E.2d 567, 572 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996); People v. Young,
538 N.E.2d 461, 472 (Ill. 1989) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979)).
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improbable or unsatisfactory as to create a reasonable doubt of [the
defendant's] guilt.' ' 70 When one considers the above cited cases, then, it is
obvious that in the view of an appellate court the evidence was so lacking
that despite viewing it in the light most favorable to the prosecution, it was
so palpably contrary, so unreasonable, improbable or unsatisfactory as to
warrant a reversal of the verdict.
Trial courts are empowered to override the verdict of a jury.
However, in practice this does not happen very often, if at all. It must be
that such trial courts either do not understand the standard of proof, or are
extremely reluctant to grant a motion for directed verdict in deference to
the verdict of a jury. The standard applied by a trial court when deciding
such a motion is the same as for appellate review; i.e. "after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trierof-fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.'
In Hodogbey, for example, the defense counsel did move for a
72
directed verdict, but the motion was denied. It took an appellate court to
undo the damage that a trial court was not willing to rectify.
III. CASE LAW DESCRIBING THE BURDEN OF PROOF
This portion of the article examines the second assumption underlying
lack of a jury instruction defining proof beyond a reasonable doubt: the
assumption which states that this phrase is its own best explanation, and
that it cannot be further defined.
As stated at the beginning of this article, a lack of instruction defining
reasonable doubt is predicated upon an assumption that this phrase is its
best meaning, and that it cannot be further defined.73 This view holds that
any efforts to define this phrase would, inevitably, lead to further
confusion, and therefore it ought to be left alone. In this section, the author
explores this assumption by answering two questions: 1) can this phrase be
defined, and 2) does our case law provide any guidance toward a possible
definition.

70.
71.
72.
73.

People v. Abdullah, 581 N.E.2d 67, 72 (I11.
App. Ct. 1991).
Juarez, 662 N.E.2d at 572.
Hodogbey, 714 N.E.2d at 1075.
See Part I, supra.
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CAN REASONABLE DOUBT BE DEFINED?

This question can be answered in one word: "yes". Jury instructions
defining this phrase abound. A number of states not only define this in the
form of a standard jury instruction, but also require that such an instruction
be tendered to the jury in every criminal case. Some other states require
tendering of instruction only when requested, or required by the nature of
the case.
Typically these instructions define the phrase both in terms of what is,
and also what is not a reasonable doubt. Consider for example, the
reasonable doubt instruction used in Idaho. Reasonable doubt is defined as
follows:
It is not mere possible doubt, because everything relating
to human affairs and depending on moral evidence is open
to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is the state of the
case, which, after the entire comparison and consideration
of all the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that
condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding
conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge.
If such jury instructions defining the phrase reasonable doubt do exist,
then why the insistence that the phrase cannot be defined?
Consider the case of Victor v. Nebraska.77 In that case, the United
States Supreme Court was asked to consider two definitions of the phrase
"reasonable doubt:" one where defendant, Clarence Victor, was convicted
of first degree murder in Nebraska, and the second where defendant, Alfred
Sandoval, was convicted of four counts of first degree murder in Los
Angeles County, California. 78 Jury instructions given in the Sandoval case,
much like Idaho's instruction, contained words like "moral evidence" and
"moral certainty. ' 79 Defendant Sandoval complained that these phrases are
antiquated and therefore are not understood today. The Court agreed with

74.

These states include Idaho, Washington, and Arkansas, among many others. See

IDAHO CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTION 103 and 103A (proposed)(1995); WISCONSIN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS - CRIMINAL 140 (1982); ARKANSAS MODEL CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS 2d 110

(2002).
75. Henry A. Diamond, Note, Reasonable Doubt: To Define or Not to Define?, 90
Colum. L. Rev. 1716, 1718 (1990).
76. People v. Rhoades, 822 P.2d 960, 978 (Idaho 1991).
77. Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 (1994).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 10.
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Defendant Sandoval that "the phrase 'moral evidence' is not a mainstay of
the modem lexicon," but held that a jury instruction using such phrase did
not require a reversal because "we do not think it means anything different
today than it did in the 1 9 th century." 80
The Supreme Court has, on various occasions been presented with an
opportunity to describe or explain the burden of the proof. However, the
court has consistently stepped away from this task, holding that "attempts
to explain the term 'reasonable doubt' do not usually result in making it
any clearer to the minds of the jury."'8 1 At least one author describes this
inaction as "an act of abject intellectual cowardice. 82
From the foregoing, it is clear that the phrase "beyond a reasonable
doubt" can indeed be defined. Thus, the assumption that it is not really
amenable to a definition generally means that someone is not satisfied with
one formulation or another. Some formulations have been described as
pegging the standard of proof lower than required under reasonable doubt
kind of doubt required, as in words like "substantial" or
by elevating the
"grave" doubt, 83 or adding uncertainty and confusion in the minds of the
jurors.

84

It is highly probable that one may not be able to define the phrase
"reasonable doubt" in a manner that would satisfy all parties within the
adversarial context of a criminal trial. However, a definition of the
criminal burden of proof is certainly possible that is not only easy to
understand but also satisfies the case law defining the level of certainty in
the minds of jurors necessary for conviction.

80. Id. at 12. A proposed Idaho ICJI Committee instruction does not incorporate
these phrases. It states:
a reasonable doubt is not a mere possible or imaginary doubt;
it is a doubt based on reason and common sense. It is the kind of
doubt, which would make an ordinary person hesitant to act in the
most important affairs of his or her own life. If after considering all
the evidence, you have a reasonable doubt about the defendant's
guilt, you must find the defendant not guilty.
IDAHO CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 103A (proposed)(1995).
81. Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304, 312 (1880); Holland v. United States, 348
U.S. 121, 138 (1955).
82. Alan M. Dershowitz, REASONABLE DOUBTS 69 (1996).
83. Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 40 (1990).
84. E.g. "a doubt with which would cause a reasonable person to hesitate to act in a
matter of importance in his or her personal life." Jon 0. Newman, A "Reasonable Doubt,"
68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 979, 982 (1993)(quoting Leonard B. Sand et al., Modem Federal Jury
Instructions T 4.01, Instruction 4-2 (1993)).
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CASE LAW AS GUIDANCE TOWARD A DEFINITION

Before one embarks upon the task of finding words that correctly
convey the meaning of the criminal burden of proof, it would be instructive
to focus on the legal rationale for requiring proof beyond a reasonable
doubt in a criminal case. Only then is it possible to ascertain whether a
particular articulation achieves the required legal rationale.
"The demand for a higher degree of persuasion in criminal cases was
recurrently expressed from ancient times but its crystallization into the
formula 'beyond a reasonable doubt' seems to have occurred as late as
1798. "85 Whereas this formulation has always been the rule in criminal
cases in this country, this standard of proof was explicitly adopted as a
constitutional requirement in 1970 in In re Winship.86 It would be
instructive to revisit that case in some detail to remind ourselves of the
rationale behind the legal requirement that a defendant cannot be found
guilty unless the fact-finder is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt.
Samuel Winship, a twelve-year-old, was accused of entering a locker
and stealing $112 from a woman's pocketbook. 87 The State of New York
filed a delinquency petition under § 712 of New York Family Court Act,
asking the court to find Samuel Winship a delinquent minor. 8 After an
adjudicatory hearing, the court ruled that the state had proven the case by a
preponderance of the evidence, and found the minor to be a delinquent
minor. 89 The state's appellate courts agreed with the application of the
preponderance standard in the context of juvenile delinquency
proceedings. 90 The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
Due Process Clause of the Constitution requires adjudications (where the
allegations are of criminal wrongdoing) only upon proof beyond a
91
reasonable doubt.

85. See McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 341(3d ed. 1984) (citations omitted).
86. 397 U.S. 358 (1969) (holding proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required by
the Due Process Clause in criminal trials when a juvenile is charged with an act that would
constitute a crime if committed by an adult).
87. Id. at 360.
88. Id. at 359.
89. Id. at 360.
90. Id.
91. See Winship, 397 U.S. at 368.
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Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, discussed at length the
rationale for this constitutional requirement in a criminal case:
The reasonable-doubt standard plays a vital role in the
American scheme of criminal procedure. It is a prime
instrumentfor reducing the risk of convictions resting on
factual error. The standard provides concrete substance
for the presumption of innocence - that bedrock 'axiomatic
at the
and elementary' principle whose 'enforcement lies 92
law.'
criminal
our
of
administration
the
of
foundation
Citing an earlier decision of the Court, Justice Brennan expanded on
this rationale stating:
[t]here is always in litigation a margin of error,
representing error in fact finding, which both parties must
take into account. Where one party has at stake an interest
of transcending value, as a criminal defendant his liberty,
this margin of error is reduced as to him by the process of
placing on the other party the burden of ...persuading the

fact-finder at the conclusion of the trial of his guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.93

Justice Harlan, in his concurrence, picked up this theme of the
function of the standard as a device to reduce the risk of erroneous criminal
convictions by explaining the constitutional rationale in the form of two
propositions: the first proposition being that in a trial "the fact finder
cannot acquire unassailably accurate knowledge of what happened. Instead,
all the fact finder can acquire is a belief of what probably happened." 94
Because of this state of affairs, there are two likely outcomes of factual
errors, one where the guilty go free, and the other where the innocent are
found guilty. 95 A "preponderance of the evidence" standard of proof
increases the risk of convicting the innocent while reducing the error of
freeing the guilty. Conversely, a higher burden of proof (beyond a

92. Winship, 397 U.S. at 363 (quoting Conffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453
(1895))(emphasis added).
93. Winship, 397 U.S. at 364 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26
(1957)).
94.

95.

Winship, 397 U.S. at 370 (emphasis added).

Id.
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reasonable doubt) reduces the risk of convicting the innocent, but increases
the risk of some guilty being set free. According to Justice Harlan, a
choice of the burden of proof - preponderance versus proof beyond a
reasonable doubt - ultimately depends upon the comparative social
disutility of each erroneous outcome. 96 For Justice Brennan, this societal
choice carries with it a practical and paramount consideration:
use of the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to
command the respect and confidence of the community in
applications of the criminal law. It is critical that the moral
force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of
proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are
being condemned. It is also important in our free society
that every individual going about his ordinary affairs have
confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty
of a criminal offense without convincing a proper fact
finder of his guilt with utmost certainty.9 7
To be sure, the criminal justice system has undergone monumental
changes since Winship. These changes, of course, also include the
composition of the Supreme Court (and hence its offerings in criminal law
context). However, to date, there is not a single case that dilutes, much less
reverses the policy rationales and objective standard required by "proof
beyond a reasonable doubt" in a criminal case. These policy rationales
were, in fact, reiterated with approval by Justice O'Connor in 1994. 9 In re
Winship, therefore, still remains a blueprint for drafting a constitutionally
acceptable definition of standard beyond a reasonable doubt.
IV. TOWARD A DEFINITION OF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT
From the foregoing, it is evident that the standard of proof
constitutionally required for conviction in a criminal case must be pegged
such that it guards against wrongful convictions, even at the expense of
some guilty being set free by convincing a fact finder of the defendant's

96. Winship, 397 U.S. at 371. "In this context, I view the requirement of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case as bottomed on a fundamental value
determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a
guilty man go free." Id.
97. Id. at 364 (emphasis added).
98. See Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 (1994).
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guilt with utmost certainty. The current state of the law in Illinois, whereby
the jury is not to be instructed on the definitions of the criminal burden of
proof, runs contrary to both of these constitutional requirements. In this
part of the article, it is argued that by not explaining the burden of proof to
the fact finders, this "bedrock" of our criminal justice system is reduced to
a flexible "shifting sand" left at the mercy of ever changing attitudes of a
particular community about perceived wrong-doers over time. The
concluding part would argue that this state of affairs can be, and indeed
should be remedied because a definition of the burden of proof that
satisfies the Winship requirement is indeed available.
A.

BEDROCK OR SHIFTING SAND?

The proponents of the view that a jury should not be instructed on a
definition of the criminal burden of proof have variously argued that
leaving the phrase undefined actually inures to the benefit of the
defendant,99 or that a "jury is best suited, as a representative body of the
community, to determine its meaning." 1° As to the first pronouncement of
some perceived benefit to the defendant, surely defendants Smith and
Rodriguez 1° ' and others whose convictions were reversed by a reviewing
court on insufficiency of evidence grounds would disagree. How long did
these defendants remain incarcerated, waiting for this perceived benefit to
finally flow to them, and with what consequences to their individual lives
and lives as members of a community? It must be acknowledged, however,
that the current state of keeping the jurors insulated from the legal
meanings of the criminal burden of proof does certainly allow some skilled
trial counsel on either side of the equation to spellbind the fact finder with
their respective eloquence and win convictions or acquittals not warranted
by the evidence. In that sense, it may be said to be an advantage for a
defendant, if indeed the defendant is lucky or resourceful enough to have
the benefit of representation by just such counsel. However, can it be said
that the "bedrock" principle of Winship is preserved and implemented by
leaving it tied to the skills and eloquence of one's trial counsel? Should the
two antagonists of our earlier imaginary scene leave the definition of a
"foot" to your skills as a persuader?

99.

State v. Johnson, 445 S.E.2d 637 (S.C. 1994).

100. Note, Reasonable Doubt: An Argument Against Definition, 108 HARV. L. REV.

1955, 1972 (1995).
101. See Part II, supra.

2003]

PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT

The notion that a jury, being representative of a community, should be
left alone to ascribe its own meanings to the criminal burden of proof is a
dangerous notion indeed. This is so because implicit in this argument is the
idea that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is a fluid concept that is to be
given concrete meanings on a case-by-case basis, and in accordance with
the ever-changing standards of a community. Justice Craig of the Illinois
Supreme Court, writing in 1915, acknowledged the diverse nature of a jury
panel in the following words: "under our system of drawing juries the
jurors are generally of widely different ages, occupations, experience, and
ability ... [w]hat would amount to a reasonable doubt or be defined as a
reasonable doubt by one juror would not necessarily be so considered by
another."' 0 2 The proponents of this view hold that such diversity would
promote deliberation amongst jurors and through a synthetic process
somehow combine the collective capacity and wisdom of such diversity to
formulate a legally correct articulation and application of the standard.I13
This view ignores the basic fact that in a criminal trial either a jury of
twelve acts as fact finders, or a judge alone acts in that capacity.
Obviously, in a bench trial then, when no such synthetic process is
possible, one necessarily has to rely upon some legal formulation that a
judge may possess as his or her understanding of the burden of proof. Such
understanding of a mind, trained in the legal process, surely cannot be said
to be the same as one that may be produced by the synthetic process of jury
deliberation. The other difficulty with this view is that by leaving this issue
tied to "community standards" truly turns it into a "shifting sand", for it is
not hard to imagine a time when the foundation of this legal requirement
described in Winship is reformulated as "it is far worse to let a guilty man
go free than to convict an innocent man than."' 1 4 Perhaps we, as a society,
105
already are at that point.
B.

AN INSTRUCTION THAT SATISFIES THE WINSHIP STANDARD

Despite the adoption of a reasonable doubt standard in criminal cases
as a constitutional requirement, to date there are no cases that specifically

102. People v. Fox, 110 N.E. 26, 32 (111. 1915).
103. See Note, supra note 100.
104. Compare with note 96.
105. In a casual discussion with my children during the writing of this article, after
listening to the fact patterns of the cases discussed in Part II, the author's 16-year-old
daughter Yasmein, having found each defendant guilty said, "Dad, I will be afraid of setting
free a criminal." She has a few more years before she may find herself on a criminal jury
panel.
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hold that the Constitution requires a jury instruction defining this standard
of proof.' °6 The opposite is also true that there are no cases that specifically
hold that such an instruction is not required, 10 7 although, in Jackson v.
Virginia,10 8 Justice Stewart indicated that the Constitution must also require
that the fact finder will rationally apply this standard that is so
"fundamental a substantive constitutional standard." 1°9 Arguments that
suggest that such an instruction be given in every criminal case are strong
indeed, because tendering of such instruction surely is a prerequisite to the
constitutionally required "rational application" of the standard. Thus for
three of the justices who wrote concurring opinions in Victor v. Nebraska,
tendering of such an instruction is required.) 1 Justice Ginsburg expressed
the view that "even if definitions of reasonable doubt are necessarily
imperfect, the alternate - refusing to define the concept at all - is not
obviously preferable.""' Justices Blackburn and Souter went a step further
and suggested that this standard:
provides protection to the innocent only to the extent that
the standard, in reality is an enforceable rule of law. To be
a meaningful safeguard, the reasonable doubt standard
must have a tangible meaning that is capable of being
understood by those who are required to apply it. It must
be stated accurately and with the precision owed to those
whose liberty or life is at risk.' 12
It has been argued that a consistent drawback of various jury
instructions on this subject is to adequately convey the meanings of this
standard because of such instructions' erroneous focus on defining "beyond
a reasonable doubt" rather than focusing on explaining "proof beyond a
reasonable doubt."' 1 3 The historical perspective outlined in Part I of this
article supports this critique.
The Federal Judicial Center, in its Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions
has proposed an articulation that meets the Winship standard and serves as

106. Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 (1994).
107. Id. at 26 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).

108. 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
109. Idat 317.

110. See Victor, 511 U.S. 1.

111. ld. at26.
112. Id at 29.

113. See Lawrence M. Solan, Refocusing the Burden of Proof in Criminal Cases:

Some Doubt About Reasonable Doubt, 78 TEx. L. REV. 105 (1999).

2003]

PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT

a solid start toward framing an articulation that is concise, easy
understand, and comports with the law."14
Justice Ginsburg specifically approved the above instruction
Victor,115 and this formulation has been accepted in some states." 6
slightly modified version of this instruction was adopted by New Jersey
State v. Medina.117 The New Jersey version generally tracks the language
the F.J.C. instruction, reading as follows:

to
in
A
in
of

The government has the burden of proving the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Some of you may have
served as jurors in civil cases, where you were told that it
is necessary to prove only that a fact is more likely true
than not true. In criminal cases, the government's proof
must be more powerful than that. It must be beyond a
reasonable doubt.
A reasonable doubt is an honest and reasonable uncertainty
in your minds about the guilt of the defendant after you
have given full and impartial consideration to all of the
evidence. A reasonable doubt may arise from the evidence

114. F.J.C. PArrERN
instruction reads:

JURY INSTRUCTION

#21 at 28 (1998). This

As I have said many times, the government has the burden of
proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Some of
you may have served as jurors in civil cases, where you were told that
it is only necessary to prove that a fact is more likely to be true that
not true. In criminal cases, the government's proof must be more
powerful than that. It must be beyond a reasonable doubt.

Id.

115.
116.
1995)) and
117.

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly
convinced of the defendant's guilt. There are very few things in this
world that we know with absolute certainty, and in criminal cases the
law does not require proof that overcomes every possible doubt. If,
based on your consideration of the evidence, you are firmly
convinced that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged, you must
find him guilty. If on the other hand, you think there is a real
possibility that he is not guilty, you must give him the benefit of the
doubt and find him not guilty.
511U.S. at26-27.
These states include Arizona (e.g., State v. Portillo, 898 P.2d 970, 974 (Ariz.
Indiana (e.g., Winegeart v. State, 665 N.E.2d 893, 902 (Ind. 1996)).
685 A.2d 1242 (N.J. 1996).
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itself or from a lack of evidence. It is a doubt that a
reasonable person hearing the same evidence would have.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof, for example, that
leaves you firmly convinced of the defendant's guilt. In
this world, we know very few things with absolute
certainty. In criminal cases the law does not require proof
that overcomes every possible doubt. If, based on your
consideration of the evidence, you are firmly convinced of
defendant's guilt of the crime charged, you must find him
on the other hand, you are not firmly convinced
guilty. If,
of defendant's guilt, you must give defendant the benefit of
18
the doubt and find him not guilty.
It is this author's view that Illinois should adopt this New Jersey
version because it is clear, concise, and conforms to the Winship
requirements.
In recent years, serious questions have been raised about the workings
of the Illinois criminal justice system. These questions, and the public
debate that ensued are, to a large part, confined to the overall debate on
capital punishment. It is not surprising, because after all, the whole debate
erupted in the context of convicted and condemned defendants being
exonerated and released. The pitfalls that have since been identified,
19 The
however, are not necessarily confined to capital cases.1
recommendations contained in the Report are focused on improving the
pretrial investigation phase, the training and conduct of the trial counsel
involved, and the law ascribing death eligibility. 2 ° It is this author's view
that a focus on the decision maker's performance in a criminal case is also
warranted, to ensure that an average citizen has confidence in the
performance of the fact finders, for "[o]ur democracy rests in no small part
on our faith in the ability of the criminal justice system to separate those
who are guilty from those who are not."' 2' A concise, clear, articulation of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt would go a long way in improving the
performance of the fact finders in criminal cases, and restoring the public's
confidence in the outcome.

118. Id. at 1251-52.
119. See Report of the Former Governor Ryan's Commission on Capital
Punishment, April 2002, available at http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/index.html
(last visited Apr. 22, 2003).
120. Id.
121. Victor, 511 U.S. at28.

